by Guenther Langohr

Looking back on that day in August 1943, why I am breathing today still escapes me. Several gaping holes had been torn through the skin of our B17. Both side gunners were dead from flack that careened through; and the bottom turret was blown away taking that gunner to his death, hopefully before he hit the ground. The copilot was hit by multiple machine gun rounds from ME109’s attacking on the way to Schweinfurt. The bombardier, wounded in both legs from flack might make it back, but would most likely never walk again. We couldn’t communicate with the tail gunner, the lines being cut by another flack burst so who knew his status. Basically, out of our crew of ten, at least 3 were dead. Another 3 wounded, 1 unknown, and three in one piece – the pilot, the top gunner, and myself – the navigator.

Our group dropped its load of bombs on Schweinfurt that day while the other 8th Air Force Group did the same on Regensburg – all with the mission to cripple the ball bearing production in Germany. The logic was if we prevented them from producing ball bearings that would stop all types of armaments since the ball bearing was integral to aircraft, tanks, wheels, and all other moving weapons. 376 B17’s left that morning for the two mission objectives each carrying 4,500 lb of bombs. With this mission most were not incendiary but high-explosive to do the most damage to the plants.

The original concept was a dual strike that would split the Luftwaffe fighters into two parts thereby cutting their strength when the bombers arrived. We sat on the runway in England waiting for fog to lift and finally took off two hours late. Unfortunately, the Regensburg flight had to wait four hours, and therefore, the original plan was doomed to failure. Later we found out that Adolf Galland’s, the German general in command of fighters, entire fighter force of about 400 planes attacked us first, could land and refuel and then attacked the Regensburg force. Our escort fighters had long since had to go back to England because of low fuel. We were hit by all the fighters, when they withdrew the flack started, both taken the highest toll yet on our bombers.

That day, 376 B17 bombers with about 2,900 men left for Germany. By the end of the mission only 33 returned without damage. 650 men had died or were being held in prison camps. 60 planes lost, and a further 122 damaged many beyond repair. Afterwards it was determined that the 8^th Air Force had actually lost 147 aircraft because so many were damaged beyond repair.

Our 91st Bomb Group, based in Bassingbourn had sent 18 planes, only 11 returned and 3 of those probably beyond repair. 169 men left that morning. Ninety-five returned unscathed. In one day our entire force was cut in half.

“As soon as the reconnaissance photographs were received on the evening of the 17th, Generals Eaker and Anderson knew that the Schweinfurt raid had been a failure. The excellent results at Regensburg were small consolation for the loss of 60 B-17s. The results of the bombing were exaggerated, and the high losses were well disguised in after-mission reports. Everyone who flew the mission stressed the importance of the escorts in reducing losses; the planners grasped only that Schweinfurt would have to be bombed again, soon, in another deep-penetration, unescorted mission.” —Donald Caldwell

Albert Speer, the German Minister of Armaments, announced only a 34% loss of production of ball bearings, which was replaced within four weeks. Our planes also had killed 203 civilians with inaccurate bombing. Neither was compensation for the terrific losses shouldered by the 8th Air Force.

We tried again in October 1943 and lost another 60 of 291 bombers sent to Schweinfurt – this time over 20% of the force, with poor results. This would see a dramatic shift in policy. Raids deep inside Germany would cease for five months. They only recommenced after the P51 Mustang US Fighter was brought into action.

With the P51’s introduction, the bombing campaign shifted its objectives. We no longer even tried to attack military sites. Mass bombing of civilian cities commenced with the objective to draw the German fighters up into the sky so the superior P51’s could attack and shoot them down. Our bombers became merely bait for the fighters. The vast destruction of Hamburg, Berlin, and ultimately Dresden, was accomplished with this strategy. Thirty thousand civilians died in Hamburg in one raid. Estimates in Dresden have been 60,000 – 125,000 in the firestorms we created with our incendiary bombs.

In retrospect, the mass bombings of the civilian cities in Germany had proven to accomplish nothing other than to brandish our fliers as terrorists. The 8th Air Force lost over 26,000 men during the war. That is more than the US Marines lost in all the battles in the Pacific – a telling statistic.

Myself, and many of my fellow soldiers, are not proud of this strategy, and we can only justify our actions with the phrase, “we followed orders” – a familiar statement in post-war trials. It causes me to think – if the Germans won the war would we have been tried as war criminals?

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1 Comment

1. I’ve only ever heard of convicted war criminals who were involved in ethnic cleansing. Were there any Luftwaffe convicted for bombing allied countries? Anyway, I wouldn´t beat youself up over it. Trouble is, after all the effort, there are still fascists in 2011 Europe – for me thats the most sickening thing. All those people who died trying to get rid of them and I have to listen to idiots who think hitler had a point.

   Comment by timmyd — January 30, 2011 @ 12:50 am

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